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United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C.  20044 
 Counsel for Respondent 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Zakaria Sheriff petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals. The BIA dismissed Sheriff’s appeal from the decision of the Immigration Judge 
finding him removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude 
(CIMT) committed within five years of the date of his admission to the United States. We 
will deny Sheriff’s petition for review.  
I 
 Sheriff immigrated to the United States from Guinea on July 26, 2009. In 
December 2013, he was convicted of two counts of attempted criminal simulation in 
Tennessee.1 In June 2015, Sheriff was convicted of theft by deception in violation of 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 3922(a)(1) and conspiracy to commit theft by deception in violation of 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903(c), based on conduct that occurred in Pennsylvania on 
September 22, 2013. Sheriff was served with a notice to appear and admitted the 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-14-115 (Criminal Simulation), 39-12-101 (Criminal 
Attempt). 
3 
 
allegations therein while denying the charge of removability. Considering both the 
Tennessee and the Pennsylvania convictions, the IJ found Sheriff removable under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). On appeal to the BIA, Sheriff argued that neither the 
Tennessee nor the Pennsylvania convictions are for CIMTs. The BIA concluded that the 
Pennsylvania theft by deception offense is a CIMT and sustained removability under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).2 
II 
 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1). “Where, as here, the BIA issues a written decision on the merits, we review 
its decision and not the decision of the IJ.” Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 605 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the BIA’s 
determination was made in “an unpublished, non-precedential decision issued by a single 
BIA member, we do not accord that determination any deference.” Id. at 606. “At most, 
[such] decisions are persuasive authority.” Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  
III 
 Sheriff first challenges the BIA’s determination that his Pennsylvania theft by 
deception conviction is for a CIMT. Usually, the two-step categorical approach 
                                                 
2 The BIA first remanded Sheriff’s case to the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania in light of new evidence that Sheriff derived U.S. 
citizenship from his father. Because Sheriff entered into a consent judgment finding that 
he was not a U.S. citizen, we do not consider that issue. This matter comes to us after the 
BIA’s second review.  
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determines whether a conviction is for a CIMT. Moreno v. Att’y Gen., 887 F.3d 160, 163 
(3d Cir. 2018). First, we “ascertain the least culpable conduct hypothetically necessary to 
sustain a conviction under the statute.” Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 471 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). We then determine whether this conduct is 
“inherently base, vile, or depraved; contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the 
duties owed other persons, either individually or to society in general.” Mehboob v. Att’y 
Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). If it is, then the 
conviction qualifies as a CIMT. Moreno, 887 F.3d at 163.  
In cases where the statute of conviction is divisible, a “modified categorical 
approach” is used instead. United States v. Ramos, 892 F.3d 599, 606–07 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013)). Under this approach, we 
inquire into the record of conviction “solely to determine the particular subpart under 
which the alien was convicted.” Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 474 n.16 (citing Partyka v. Att’y 
Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 416 (3d Cir. 2005)). The analysis then proceeds in the same manner 
as under the traditional categorical approach.  
The parties dispute whether the categorical or modified categorical approach 
applies in this case under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).3 The 
                                                 
3 Mathis identified three methods for determining whether the items listed in a 
statute are elements or means—in other words, whether the statute is divisible. First, a 
court should “ascertain whether ‘a state court decision definitively answers the 
question.’” United States v. Henderson, 841 F.3d 623, 628 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256). Second, a court “may look to ‘the statute on its face.’” Id. 
Finally, “if state law fails to provide clear answers,” the court “may look to the ‘record of 
a prior conviction itself.’” Id. Sheriff and the Government disagree about whether the 
Mathis methods must be followed in order. Sheriff insists that the steps are sequential 
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disposition of this case does not require us to decide that dispute because we previously 
analyzed the entire statute at issue. Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(overruled on other grounds by Al-Sharif v. U.S.C.I.S., 734 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc)). Although Nugent was not deciding a moral turpitude question, we there 
concluded after extensive analysis that § 3922(a) is “bottomed on ‘fraud or deceit.’” 
Nugent, 367 F.3d at 179. And Supreme Court precedent (and our own case law) hold that 
crimes “in which fraud is an ingredient” form the core of moral turpitude cases. Jordan v. 
De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951); Doe v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 266, 270 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2011). The Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that “[t]he phrase ‘crime involving 
moral turpitude’ has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct.” 
Jordan, 341 U.S. at 232. 
 The upshot of all this is that even if Sheriff is correct that the BIA wrongly 
applied a modified categorical approach, such error would be harmless. As the BIA 
correctly noted in its opinion, the conduct criminalized by § 3922(a) is “more akin to 
fraud and deception than theft.” AR 5. Sheriff’s arguments fail because they mistakenly 
focus on the nature of the theft involved, rather than on the fraud. Even the least culpable 
                                                 
while the Government says they are not. The first step, looking to state law, definitively 
answers whether Sheriff’s statute of conviction is divisible. Commonwealth v. Joy, 384 
A.2d 1288, 1291 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). If, as Sheriff argues, the Mathis steps are 
sequential, then § 3922(a) is not divisible and it must be examined in its entirety. But if 
the Government is correct, looking to the record to determine exactly what Sheriff was 
convicted of—per step three—is just as appropriate. The BIA then would have correctly 
focused its inquiry solely on subsection § 3922(a)(1). 
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conduct criminalized by § 3922(a)—which Sheriff argues is found in § 3922(a)(3)—
requires intentional fraud or deceit, historically the core of moral turpitude cases. 
And although “an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon 
which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be 
sustained,” this rule does not “require that [the Court] convert judicial review of agency 
action into a ping-pong game.” Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 
2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Remand to the agency is “not 
required when it ‘would be an idle and useless formality.’” Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). Given the clarity and accuracy of the BIA’s reasoning, a remand 
here would be the kind of “idle and useless formality” contemplated by Yuan.  
 Sheriff’s second argument—that the term “crime involving moral turpitude” is 
unconstitutionally vague—is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. Vagueness 
challenges are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, but this Court recently considered the 
constitutionality of CIMT in the removal context in Moreno. The Court’s analysis was 
“guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).” 
Moreno, 887 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2018). In Jordan, the Supreme Court held that “the 
phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ was not void for vagueness because it complied 
with ‘[t]he essential purpose of the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine[,]’ i.e., it ‘warn[ed]’ the 
defendant that, were he to commit a crime ‘in which fraud was an ingredient[,]’ then the 
‘statutory consequence’ of his conviction would be deportation.” Moreno, 887 F.3d 160, 
165–66 (quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 229–32).  A morally turpitudinous offense has been 
“consistently defined” as one “that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the 
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accepted rules of morality and the duties owed other persons, either individually or to 
society in general.” Id. (quoting Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
Because Jordan remains good law and squarely addresses this issue, precedent forecloses 
Sheriff’s constitutional argument.4 
IV 
 We will deny Sheriff’s petition for review for the reasons stated.  
                                                 
4 The Court thanks pro bono counsel for its able representation of Mr. Sheriff. 
